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The End of Religious Freedom:  
What is at Stake? 
Nelson Tebbe* 
 
Warnings can be heard today that the American tradition of religious 
freedom is newly imperiled and may even be nearing exhaustion. Steven 
Smith is an eloquent and accomplished herald of that development,1 and his 
warnings have been echoed by other distinguished authors.2  They worry that 
we are seeing an unprecedented attack on the very idea of constitutional 
protections for religion.3  Although conflicts between secularism and 
religion are nothing new, this critique is thought to be both more 
fundamental—because it targets not just particular applications of religious 
freedom but the notion itself—and more likely to succeed. Religious 
freedom as a constitutional concept is thought to be at risk. 
Three distinct concerns combine to produce this worry, in my view.  
First, there is the argument that religion is not special—that it should not 
draw constitutional protection different from the guarantees extended to 
other commitments of conscience.4  If religion is not special, then religious 
freedom as a distinct right could be lost, even if religious actors continue to 
be protected under other provisions ensuring liberty and equality. Second is 
the concern that a coherent or rational theory of religious freedom cannot be 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  
 1.  See Steven D. Smith, The Last Chapter?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 903 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, 
The Last Chapter]; STEVEN D. SMITH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
11 (2014). 
 2.  See generally, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, U. ILL. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Laycock, Culture Wars], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2304427; Douglas Laycock, Sex, Atheism, and the Free Exercise of 
Religion, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407 (2011) [hereinafter Laycock, Sex, Atheism].  
 3.  See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 407, 411; Smith, The Last Chapter, supra note 
1, at 903–04.   
 4.  See Smith, supra note 1, at 903-05 (describing Noah Feldman’s argument that religious 
freedom should not receive special constitutional solicitude). 
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found.5  Courts interpret and apply the free exercise and nonestablishment 
provisions in ways that are incoherent, and unavoidably so. That poses a 
threat to the future of religious freedom because it engenders instability and 
vulnerability.6  Third, there is a sense that the culture wars are over and that 
they have been won by the forces of secular liberalism.7  Evidence of that 
conclusion is strongest in the area of LGBT rights, but it includes other 
developments as well.8  A new egalitarian orthodoxy is seen to imperil the 
rights of religious believers who now constitute an embattled minority in 
need of counter-majoritarian protection. Yet the same developments that 
make constitutional protections more necessary also threaten rights of 
religious freedom, on this view. 
In this short Response, I bracket the substance of debates over the health 
of religious freedom doctrine and whether religion is special.  Instead, I ask 
what is at stake in them.  In particular, I am interested in the consequences 
not only for constitutional litigation, but also for legislation on related 
issues, and for concrete political controversies that implicate constitutional 
questions surrounding religious actors.  What would change on the ground if 
one side or the other were to prevail on questions such as whether religion is 
constitutionally distinctive or whether the doctrine of religious freedom is 
coherent?  
My hypothesis will be that little of consequence turns on those debates 
when it comes to ground-level legal disputes.  In practice, if not in theory, 
constitutional actors are committed to protecting religious citizens, and that 
is unlikely to change fundamentally in the foreseeable future.  Americans 
also carry competing commitments to separation of church and state, to 
fairness for nonreligious persons, to equality for sexual minorities, to 
equality of opportunity for workers and other economic actors, and so forth.  
Whether that complex of values gets conceptualized as religious freedom or 
 
 5.  See, e.g., id. at 25 (noting “flagrant inconsistency” in the Court’s doctrines on religious 
freedom and doubting whether it can be avoided). 
 6.  See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 7.  See id. at 22 (describing a conflict between “traditional religion and the emerging egalitarian 
orthodoxy”). 
 8.  See Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 412–19 (attributing recent attacks on religious 
freedom to the LGBT movement and to the recent social salience of nonbelievers); Richard 
Schragger, The Politics of Free Exercise After Employment Division v. Smith: Same-Sex Marriage, 
the “War On Terror,” and Religious Freedom, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2009, 2009–10 (2011) 
(focusing on the LGBT movement and attacks on Islam after 9/11). 
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not, and whether religion is thought to occupy a special place in the 
constitutional order—those are questions that themselves will have little 
bearing on practical outcomes.  
That is not to say that low stakes equals no stakes.9  Undeniably, the 
disputes themselves are important—people care deeply and rightly about 
legislative prayer, the contraception mandate, exemptions from laws 
protecting LGBT people, and so forth.  My skepticism rather concerns how 
much turns on whether we conceptualize these debates as questions of 
religious freedom as opposed to broader constitutional concerns about 
individual liberty and equal citizenship, and whether legal frameworks in the 
area are comparatively clear and stable.  Outcomes will depend more 
directly on how less abstract commitments are managed in light of ongoing 
social and political developments. 
Furthermore, abstract legal and moral questions about the 
distinctiveness of religion matter for their own sake, and they can influence 
more practical matters (just as they are influenced by them).  But that 
influence typically is indirect.   
Below, I first offer examples of cases where the specialness of religion 
underdetermines its protection.10  Then, I examine disputes where courts 
have been charged with incoherence or irrationality and I ask whether the 
charge is accurate, what alternatives exist, and how much doctrinal 
muddiness can undermine actual protection. Third, I consider the concern 
with liberal orthodoxy. I assess the trope and I determine that it currently 
functions as a warning rather than a diagnosis of inadequate protection for 
religious freedom. I conclude the Response by agreeing with Steven Smith’s 
prediction that religious actors’ success in legal disputes will depend most 
centrally on their fortunes in broader social and political dynamics. Whether 
constitutional decision-makers protect observance, in other words, will 
likely follow more directly from the ability of traditional believers to 
convince Americans that their causes are worthwhile than it will follow from 
doctrinal niceties.  
Elsewhere, I defend the view that complex commitments around 
 
 9.  Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
305, 319–21 (2010) (arguing that debates over constitutional interpretation have “low stakes, not no 
stakes”). 
 10.  See infra notes 13–48 and accompanying text. 
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religious freedom can be managed.11  Here, the argument is simply that 
surprisingly few legal disputes would be affected by “the end of religious 
freedom” as such.12  We should care about these debates, but we should care 
about them because of their symbolic impact and moral importance, not 
primarily because of constitutional outcomes on the ground.  
*** 
A first concern voiced by Steven Smith and others is that religion may 
lose its special status in the American constitutional order.13  Under the new 
regime, religious actors would be protected, but only as holders of general 
rights to free speech, due process, equal protection, etc., and only to the 
extent that others are protected under those provisions. Not only would that 
protection be indistinct, it would also be insufficient.14  Smith gives one 
main example of a decision where religion is special and wins protection, 
and one example where religion is elided and goes unprotected.15  Yet there 
also are plenty of instances where religious actors win under general 
provisions, and where they lose under specific protections, as I will explain 
in this Section.16 
Recall first Smith’s own examples.  In Christian Legal Society v. 
Martinez, claims by religious actors were evaluated under the same free 
speech doctrines that apply to everyone, and they were rejected.17  The Court 
 
 11.  See Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127–30 (2011) [hereinafter Tebbe, 
Nonbelievers] (adopting a polyvalent approach to problems of religious freedom). 
 12.  See infra notes 101–12 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 904–05; Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 
2, at 39–40 (connecting the argument that religion is not constitutionally distinctive to other 
developments and arguing that together they are “deeply threatening to the American tradition of 
religious liberty”).  
 14.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 904 (suggesting that the end of religious 
freedom would be “premature and deeply unfortunate”); id. at 905 (“[T]the regime of religious 
freedom is currently in jeopardy.”).  For Smith, protection will be insufficient without distinctive 
guarantees for religion because laws passed by the liberal state will disproportionately impact 
traditional religions.  Cf. id. at 929 (“[E]qual treatment [in CLS v. Martinez] meant in reality that 
religion can be burdened in ways that other sorts of commitments or interests will not be, because a 
rule prohibiting associations from conditioning membership on religious belief obviously will have a 
much more severe impact on churches or other religious associations than on other groups.”). 
 15.  See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra notes 17–48 and accompanying text.  
 17.  130 S. Ct. 2971, 2978 (2010).  According to Smith, the CLS v. Martinez holding “seemed to 
evince the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the . . . position . . . [that] religious individuals and 
associations should enjoy the same protections that others enjoy . . . but religion should not be 
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turned away a complaint that Hastings Law School had denied official 
recognition to the Christian Legal Society (CLS) in violation of free speech 
and free exercise rights.18  Law school administrators reasoned that the 
organization violated the school’s “all-comers” policy by effectively 
denying membership on the basis of religion and sexual orientation.19  The 
Court treated the school’s program of recognizing student groups as a 
limited public forum and it upheld the “all-comers” policy as reasonable and 
viewpoint neutral.20 Evaluating religious actors on the same terms as others, 
the Court turned away their challenge. 
In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. EEOC,21 
conversely, the Court extended special constitutional solicitude to religion 
and found in its favor.22  There, the Justices held that a Christian school 
could dismiss a teacher even if antidiscrimination laws otherwise would 
have protected her.23  The Court reasoned that because she counted as clergy, 
the school had a constitutional right to dismiss her under the ministerial 
exception doctrine.24  Rather than accept the invitation of the Solicitor 
General to evaluate the case under the rule for expressive associations that 
applies to everyone, the Court held unanimously that religion was special in 
this regard—that the ministerial exception was grounded in the free exercise 
and nonestablishment provisions of the First Amendment, which are 
particular to religion.25  In this situation, finding that religion was special 
 
singled out for special or differential protection.”  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 928. 
 18.   Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2978.   
 19.  Id. at 2980 (“CLS’s bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination 
Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation.”).  Actually, there was 
a factual dispute about whether the school really did have an “all-comers” policy or whether it 
prohibited discrimination only on specific grounds, including religion, but the majority found that 
the parties had stipulated to an “all-comers” policy and analyzed the dispute accordingly.  Id. at 
2982–84. 
 20.  Id. at 2984, 2995.   
 21.  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 22.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 929–32 (discussing Hosanna-Tabor). 
 23.  Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. 
 24.  Id. at 708 (“we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception”); 
id. at 709 (“Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the First 
Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious 
employer.”). 
 25.  Id. at 706 (calling “remarkable” the view that religious activity does not enjoy distinctive 
constitutional treatment in this context). 
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meant not only giving it distinctive constitutional treatment, but also giving 
it greater protection, because the ministerial exception almost certainly is 
more powerful than freedom of expressive association.26 
Yet it would be wrong to conclude that extending distinctive 
constitutional solicitude to religion necessarily means granting it stronger 
protection against majoritarian regulation.  In certain cases, the Court has 
found in favor of religious actors using general provisions, and it has found 
against them even while treating them specially.  Specialness 
underdetermines constitutional protection, as it turns out. 
In a long line of decisions, for instance, religious actors have deployed 
general speech theories to win substantial victories against governments that 
sought to exclude them from benefits.27  Interestingly, these equal access 
cases involved a deliberate strategy by churches and prayer groups to 
leverage the general language of individual rights—in particular, the 
language of equality and antidiscrimination—this time on behalf of 
traditional religious actors rather than against them.28  In decisions like 
Rosenberger, Good News Club, and Lamb’s Chapel, the Court held that 
public educational institutions could not single out religious actors for 
exclusion once they opened their buildings and resources to a broad range of 
other groups.29  In fact, the Court used the very same public forum doctrine 
featured in CLS v. Martinez to find in favor of religious actors on the ground 
that exclusion of their perspectives constituted prohibited viewpoint 
discrimination.30   
Likewise, general government speech doctrine has been deployed 
 
 26.  See Tebbe, Nonbelievers, supra note 11, at 1146–47 (demonstrating that the ministerial 
exception provides stronger protection than the general right to expressive association). 
 27.  See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Rosenberger v. 
Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 28.  See NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA’S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM—AND 
WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 206–07 (2005) (describing religious actors’ strategy of deploying 
antidiscrimination language and casting themselves as minorities). 
 29.  Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106–12; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–37; Lamb’s Chapel, 
508 U.S. at 391–97. 
 30.  See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111–12 (“[W]e reaffirm our holdings in Lamb's 
Chapel and Rosenberger that speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot be excluded 
from a limited public forum on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious viewpoint.  
Thus, we conclude that Milford's exclusion of the Club from use of the school, pursuant to its 
community use policy, constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.”). 
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effectively to preserve the integrity of majoritarian religious messaging.  In 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, for instance, the Court concluded that a 
town could erect a Ten Commandments monument in a public park without 
being forced to also include a monument expressing the views of a minority 
faith.31  Because the government was expressing its own views, it could 
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.32  Although technically the decision 
turned away a challenge by a minority faith, it reinforced an assumption that 
a government could recognize majoritarian beliefs, including religious 
ones.33 
Other equality rules have similarly protected religious actors.  In Church 
of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, Justice Kennedy reasoned 
for the majority that a town could not discriminate against Santeria, a faith 
that practiced animal sacrifice.34  Town lawmakers had passed an ordinance 
banning animal killing, but it was riddled with so many exceptions that it 
effectively targeted only Santeria practices.35  Justice Kennedy reasoned that 
although religious groups could not claim special exemptions from general 
laws under free exercise doctrine, they also were protected from 
extraordinary government discrimination.36  Although it is possible to 
understand the case as applying antidiscrimination protection only to 
religious groups, an equally natural reading is that the decision enforced 
equality by requiring the government to refrain from irrational 
 
 31.  555 U.S. 460, 464–67 (2009). Id. at 464–67 . 
 32.  Id. at 479–81. 
 33.  See id.  There was no Establishment Clause challenge to the Ten Commandments monument 
before the Court.  See id. at 466 (noting that the petitioners brought only a free speech claim).  
Summum wanted both displays included, not both excluded, so it did not object to the existing 
monument.  See Bernadette Meyler, Summum and the Establishment Clause, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 95, 102 (2009) (noting that Summum did not bring an Establishment Clause claim), 
available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/32/LRColl2009n32 
Meyler.pdf.  Any such challenge probably would have failed under existing doctrine.  See 
Christopher C. Lund, Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 
104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 46, 50–52 (2009), available at https://www.law.northwestern.edu/ 
lawreview/Colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28Lund.pdf.   
 34.  508 U.S. 520, 523–24 (1993).  
 35.  Id. at 535–38. 
 36.  Id. at 532 (“At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at 
issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is 
undertaken for religious reasons.”). 
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discrimination.37 
Not only has the Court extended significant protection to believers 
under general constitutional principles like these, but also it has denied 
protection to religious groups under special provisions.38  For several 
decades—during the ’60s, ’70s, and ’80s, roughly—the Court purported to 
extend free exercise protection to believers whose practices were 
substantially burdened by general laws.39  Yet, as many commentators have 
observed, religious actors rarely prevailed.40  Aside from unemployment 
benefits cases like Sherbert v. Verner, free exercise claimants won only one 
case, in which Amish parents sought to control their children’s educations 
despite truancy laws.41  Otherwise, distinctive constitutional protection 
proved useless in case after case.42  
Establishment Clause cases are more difficult to assimilate to the model.  
On the one hand, the Establishment Clause could be understood to treat 
religion in a special way—but unfavorably.  Consider Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, the legislative prayer case that is pending before the Supreme 
Court.  When the lower court struck down the town’s prayer scheme, it 
singled out one type of government speech for a prohibition that would not 
have been imposed on any secular message.43  In the Establishment Clause 
 
 37.  Cf. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 52 (2007) (arguing that although the Constitution should not treat religion with 
special solicitude, it can and must protect religious actors from government “hostility and neglect”).  
It is possible to think of the ban on discrimination on the basis of religion as grounded in equal 
protection rather than the First Amendment.  See Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and 
the Equal Protection Clause: Why the Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 
911–20 (2013); Bernadette Meyler, The Equal Protection of Free Exercise: Two Approaches and 
Their History, 47 B.C. L. REV. 275, 275 (2006). 
 38.  See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 
(1986); Lyng v. Northwest Indian CPA, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 39.  The leading case that articulated this approach is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 
(1963). 
 40.  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111, 1127 (1990); James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1412 (1992) (“[T]he free 
exercise claimant, both in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, rarely succeeded under the 
compelling interest test.”). 
 41.  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972). 
 42.  See, e.g., Lyng, at 485 U.S. at 448–49; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509–10; Lee, 455 U.S. at 259–
60. 
 43.  Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 34 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 
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area, in other words, special treatment for religion does not promote 
religious freedom in any straightforward way.44  
Outside the courts, similar mismatches are commonplace. Congress and 
the Obama Administration have extended significant exemptions from the 
contraception mandate only to religious groups,45 and yet those protections 
fall short of what many religious actors demand.46  On the other hand, many 
of the most significant and effective protections for religious individuals and 
organizations are available generally, such as the tax exemption for 
charitable nonprofits47 and exemptions for medical service providers who 
object to contraception or abortion.48  
My conclusion from these examples is that the end of religious freedom, 
taken for now to mean the end of special constitutional solicitude, need not 
entail weaker protection for religious actors.  Rather, the relationship 
between constitutional distinctiveness and constitutional protection is more 
complicated.  Whether individual believers and their organizations will win 
particular disputes depends more on the application of lower-level 
commitments, such as bans on viewpoint discrimination and principles of 
expressive association, than on abstract debates over whether religion enjoys 
 
(2013). 
 44.  Of course, it is possible to argue that separationism does more to protect religious practice 
than to stifle it.  See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 698–99 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring).  
Moreover, I have recently argued that the prohibition on religious endorsement in government 
speech is not as unusual as many people assume—many other types of government speech are in fact 
restricted by constitutional principles.  See Nelson Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. 
L. REV. 648, 654–57 (2013) [hereinafter Tebbe, Nonendorsement].  I caution, however, that 
limitations on government endorsement of religion continue to be distinctive in some respects.  Id. at 
711–12. 
 45.  See, e.g., Laycock, Culture Wars, supra note 2, at 123–25 (discussing the Obama 
Administration’s rule on contraception). 
 46.  See id. at 1 (arguing that the Obama Administration’s rules on contraception “offer very 
substantial protection to religious institutions, and they are likely to satisfy most judges. Religious 
institutions should claim victory or perhaps seek to negotiate minor adjustments” but noting that the 
rules concerning for-profit employers present a closer case). 
 47.  See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (upholding a property tax 
exemption that included land owned by religious organizations for religious worship). 
 48.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7(b) (2000) (protecting the ability of medical providers who 
receive public funds to refuse to perform, assist with, or make facilities available for, abortions if 
doing so is contrary to “religious beliefs or moral convictions”); 45 C.F.R. § 88, 73 Fed. Reg. 78072, 
2008 WL 9742178 (2008) (HHS final regulations implementing “federal healthcare conscience 
protection statutes”). 
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a unique place in American constitutionalism.  Even more centrally, it 
depends on political and social dynamics that I will discuss below. Much the 
same can be said for the worry over incoherence or irrationality in religious 
freedom decisions, as it turns out. 
*** 
A second concern that contributes to the diagnosis of an end to religious 
freedom is that court opinions and other constitutional decisions on the 
subject are increasingly and irredeemably incoherent.49  That is largely 
because the internal logic of religious freedom began historically with 
theological justifications that slowly gave way to secular rationales. But 
without its theological tenets, religious freedom lacked a coherent logic. 
That paradox has led to a jurisprudence of religious freedom that is at war 
with itself, that results in decisions that seem illogical without a theological 
underpinning, and that therefore is vulnerable to attack and even 
elimination.50 
In other work, Smith has offered Kent Greenawalt’s writing as an 
example of the troubled state of the dominant discourse on religious 
freedom.51  Greenawalt maintains that plural values count in religion clause 
jurisprudence, and that these values are not reducible to a master 
commitment such as equality or separationism.52  But Smith thinks that 
managing multiple secular values is not possible in religious freedom cases 
without ultimate resort to reasoning that is conclusory or tantamount to ipse 
dixitism.53  Greenawalt skillfully considers many arguments for and against a 
particular outcome in a given scenario, but ultimately he simply chooses 
among them without giving a rationale.54  Again, Smith thinks this type of 
reasoning is not really the fault of Greenawalt, whose skill is beyond 
 
 49.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 925–26. 
 50.  See id. at 911 (calling rationales for religious freedom “shaky” and “hardly . . . stable and 
secure”); id. at 923 (suggesting that Supreme Court decisions in the area have been “notoriously 
erratic (or, some might say, unprincipled)”; id. at 924 (diagnosing “flagrant inconsistency in 
adhering to announced doctrines”). 
 51.  See Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1893 (2009) [hereinafter Smith, Discourse] (reviewing 2 KENT GREENAWALT, 
RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS). 
 52.  2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS 
1–15 (2008). 
 53.  See Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1905–06. 
 54.  See id. at 1870–72. 
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question, and more a symptom of the deep incoherence that characterizes 
religious freedom discourse.55 
But does resolving actual disputes really involve conclusoriness, or just 
complexity?  And if the latter, is there any available methodology that would 
eliminate it?  Consider some of Smith’s examples of places where reason 
fails. Probably his leading exhibit is Greenawalt’s discussion of Good News 
Club.56  One of the equal access cases, that decision required a school to 
allow a Christian club for children to meet directly after school and in the 
building just like other clubs and community groups.57  The Court found that 
excluding religious groups constituted viewpoint discrimination and 
therefore violated the Free Speech Clause.58  Greenawalt criticizes Good 
News Club. He argues that it differs from earlier cases because it involved 
young children who were more vulnerable to school endorsement of 
religion, because Good News Club was an outside group that sought to 
evangelize, and because the meetings took place immediately after school.59  
Combined, these features made it reasonable for school officials to worry 
that children would perceive official approval of the group, particularly if 
their peers were attending in large numbers, and that children might be 
unduly influenced to prevail on parents to allow them to join the club.60 
Smith calls Greenawalt’s conclusion a “bald pronouncement[]”—or a 
statement that “at least look[s] like” a bald pronouncement.61  It exemplifies 
the conclusory reasoning that is symptomatic of the deteriorated state of 
legal discourse on religious freedom.62  But is it really bankrupt?  Not only 
does Greenawalt offer reasons for his conclusion, but those reasons 
implement his articulated commitments of principle.63  One of those is 
 
 55.  See id. at 1905–06 (“Greenawalt's default on the level of justification is not so much an 
individual failure.  Rather, it is a reflection of the current condition of the tradition.”); see also id. at 
1893 (softening his earlier indictment of Greenawalt’s prescriptions). 
 56.  See id. at 1893.  Elsewhere, I discuss Greenawalt’s treatment of this case in a different 
context.  Nelson Tebbe, Eclecticism, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 317, 318–19 (2008) [hereinafter Tebbe, 
Eclecticism]. 
 57.  Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. 533 U.S. 98, 111–12 (2001). 
 58.  Id. at 107. 
 59.  2 GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 206. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1893. 
 62.  Id. at 1905–06. 
 63.  See 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 6–13 (identifying and describing a group of basic 
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concern for individual autonomy.64  Government violates that principle 
whenever it interferes with individual choice around religion by influencing 
individual choice in favor of a particular religion, all religion, or no 
religion.65 Undue influence over young children could well frustrate that 
value.  Now, Greenawalt does not explicitly invoke a principle of individual 
autonomy in his discussion of Good News Club,66 but its involvement is 
impossible to miss, given the theoretical framework that he articulates at the 
outset. So his conclusion is supported not only by reasons, but by principled 
ones. 
My point here is not that conclusoriness or contradiction are entirely 
absent from religious freedom scholarship—it would be foolish to say that—
but rather that they may not be as common as suggested.  There are other 
examples for which the concern seems stronger.  Take for instance Lee v. 
Weisman, where the Court struck down a graduation prayer at a public high 
school.67  Greenawalt thinks this is a difficult case because, on the one hand, 
religious students and officials wish to dignify an important rite of passage 
by invoking their deity while, on the other hand, dissenting members of the 
school community may feel coerced into observance because attendance at 
graduation is often understood to be mandatory.68  After making several 
additional points, Greenawalt concludes that the Court probably was correct 
to disallow the prayer out of concern for the principle that government may 
not sponsor religion, but he expresses “regret” about that conclusion.69  In a 
follow-up article, Greenawalt offers his analysis of Lee v. Weisman as an 
example of genuine value conflict.70  He himself believes that in such cases 
reasons run out—that all he can say to justify his judgment is that the 
reasons supporting the Court’s decision seem to him to be stronger than the 
reasons cutting against it.71  
 
Establishment Clause values). 
 64.  See id. at 9. 
 65.  Id. at 9. 
 66.  See id. at 206. 
 67.  505 U.S. 577, 577 (1992). 
 68.  GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 112. 
 69.  Id. at 115. 
 70.  Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some 
Critiques, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010). 
 71.  Id. 
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Whether Greenawalt’s discussion of this case involves genuine 
irrationality or ipse dixit reasoning is a deep issue that I am addressing in 
longer-format work.72  Here I raise two more immediate questions.  First, 
does the difficulty of Lee v. Weisman really suggest an impoverished 
discourse, bereft of coherent foundations, or does it simply reflect a hard 
case?  It is interesting to consider whether theological treatments, which are 
sometimes imagined to provide a firmer foundation for religious freedom 
jurisprudence, would actually be any more straightforward in such a case.  
Surely, at least some religious philosophies would care not just about the 
desires of Christian students to solemnize their graduation ceremony, but 
also about the concerns of students who identify with dissenting sects of 
Christianity, other religions, or even nonbelieving orientations.  Such 
diversity among theologies, and complexity within them, are deemphasized 
by general references to “traditional religion.”73  Has there ever existed a 
historical period in which views were united about questions of the proper 
relationship between religion and government?  More likely, there have 
always been hard cases, and always will be.  If that is right, then their 
persistence need not indicate a degenerate discourse. 
Second, are hard cases really more prevalent in the area of religious 
freedom, as compared to other constitutional domains governed by open-
ended provisions like freedom of speech, equal protection, due process, the 
Eighth Amendment, or the Fourth Amendment?  To know for certain would 
require a systematic, comparative study.  Beginning a law review article 
with the formula “the law of [area X] is in utter disarray” is as commonplace 
in other areas of law as it is in this one, it seems.  A possible conclusion is 
that all of American constitutional doctrine is bankrupt—because overly 
political, undemocratic, elitist, or unpredictable—but even if that were the 
case it does little to support any particular impoverishment of religious 
freedom doctrine because of specific internal or external developments.  
So what exactly is at stake in claims that constitutional decision-making 
on questions of religious freedom is doomed to achieve only modus vivendi 
solutions but never principled ones?  A close reading of Smith suggests three 
more particular worries: that constitutional actors are biased in favor of 
 
 72.  See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Constitutionalism (unpublished manuscript). 
 73.  See, e.g., Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 919 (referring to “traditional religion” 
and “traditional faiths”). 
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outcomes that disfavor traditional religion,74 that they are elitist in the sense 
of being disconnected from majoritarian beliefs,75 and that they will make 
decisions that erode the rule of law because they are arbitrary.76  Those 
charges deserve more detailed responses than I can give in this short essay.  
But, again, it is worth considering whether they disproportionately 
characterize religious freedom jurisprudence—as compared to other areas of 
constitutional law—and whether any imagined jurisprudence, theological or 
otherwise, could root them out.  Social and political forces will work on 
constitutional actors in this area just as they do in others, although of course 
not in exactly the same way.77  Comparing those dynamics should shape our 
research agendas.  
*** 
Third and finally, there is the concern that American government is 
being overtaken by an orthodoxy of liberal egalitarianism that will fail to 
protect adherents of traditional religion. Here is how the argument runs: 
because many traditional religions teach that their own beliefs are true, while 
others are mistaken, they inevitably come into conflict with liberal 
egalitarianism, which insists that government owes all its citizens equal 
respect.78  Traditional religion and today’s liberalism therefore are seen to be 
“fundamentally incompatible.”79  
Opposition to orthodoxy is of course a central liberal tenet—perhaps the 
central tenet—so the charge here is one of inconsistency as well as simple 
 
 74.  See, e.g., Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 925–26 (noting that “flagrant 
inconsistency” in court decisions displeases adherents of traditional religion in part because “they 
often lose particular battles”).  Elsewhere, Smith notes that Greenawalt’s ostensibly principled 
method usually generates outcomes that favor the progressive side of the debate.  See Smith, 
Discourse, supra note 51, at 1890–91. 
 75.  See Smith, Discourse, supra note 51, at 1900.  After noting that Washington, Jefferson, and 
Lincoln all violated the rule against government pronouncements on religious truth, Smith asks 
whether perhaps more recent history supports the rule: “But tradition is an evolving matter, and in 
our more secular and diverse society, we understand that such expressions are divisive and 
inappropriate.  Don’t we?  Well, actually, no: we don’t—not unless the ‘we’ is understood to refer to 
a smaller and more select fellowship (like, say, devout readers of the New York Times?).”  Id. 
 76.  See, e.g., id. at 1871 (“What the tradition desperately needs, it seems, is . . . a careful, 
systematic demonstration that controversies over religious freedom can actually be resolved through 
‘reasoned analysis, as distinguished from rhetoric.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
 77.  Smith and I largely agree on this point, to which I will return at the end of this Response. 
 78.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 921. 
 79.  Id. at 919. 
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injustice.  It is also entirely familiar.  It is a version of the classic question of 
how liberal governments ought to treat illiberal citizens or communities. 
Liberal theory has given answers, but the key issue here is not whether those 
answers are convincing, but whether the actual practice of American 
government is justifiable under any of them.  Whatever the answer in theory, 
according to Smith, traditional believers have reason to worry that liberal 
orthodoxy has little room for them.80  Richard Garnett similarly believes 
there is a real risk that political forces on the question of gay marriage will 
come to view religious believers as minorities, and not the type of minorities 
deserving of individual rights against the majority but as outliers whose 
views are unworthy of respect.81 
Are these fears justified?  Has American liberalism become so muscular 
that it actually has morphed into nearly its opposite—an intolerant form of 
government that brooks no dissent?  So far, it does not seem that anyone is 
claiming that much.  Rather, scholars are warning of that possibility, should 
developments continue in the direction they have been moving.82  Certain 
cases are troubling to them, such as CLS v. Martinez.  John Inazu highlights 
that case and argues for stronger protection for group pluralism out of a 
skepticism for “state orthodoxy.”83  Yet he is not arguing that we have 
reached that point.84  Countervailing cases such as Hosanna-Tabor are 
comforting indicators to traditional believers that they will continue to be 
protected, even when they engage in illiberal behavior, especially when 
those decisions are unanimous.85  At worst, for people who worry about 
liberal orthodoxy, the doctrine is in tension with itself. 
 
 80.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 923 (“Once secular egalitarianism is accepted 
and entrenched as the prevailing orthodoxy, how much sympathy or toleration can [religious 
believers] expect over the long run to receive from their new and puritanically egalitarian secular 
masters?”). 
 81.  Richard W. Garnett, Worth Worrying About? Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Freedom, 
COMMONWEAL (Aug. 5, 2013, 3:35 PM), https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/worth-worrying-
about.  
 82.  See infra notes 83–84, 93–101 and accompanying text. 
 83.  John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty, 92 N.C. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 84.  See id. 
 85.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 929–32 (addressing Hosanna-Tabor); cf. Inazu, 
supra note 83, at 40–43 (discussing Hosanna-Tabor and arguing that the decision would have been 
more firmly grounded in a general right to associate that would protect all groups, secular and 
sacred). 
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Perhaps a more difficult area for traditional believers would be the 
Establishment Clause, which seems to expressly disfavor public 
endorsements of religious views even while governments remain free to 
embrace secular or liberal perspectives.86  This disparity could be seen as 
constitutional enforcement of secular orthodoxy in the context of 
government expression.  One response is that religion actually is not all that 
exceptional in this regard.87  I have recently argued that in fact the 
Constitution limits government endorsement of ideas not only with respect 
to religion, but for other topics as well.88  Racialized speech and 
electioneering, for example, are also prohibited, and several other 
endorsements face similar constitutional restrictions grounded in various 
provisions including the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, 
and the Free Speech Clause itself. So religion is not singled out here: 
government can still engage in much religious speech, and where it cannot 
there often exist analogous secular barriers.  
Another response is that the Court, if anything, seems to be moving in 
the direction of allowing more religious speech by the government, not less.  
In particular, the Justices have relied on standing doctrine to take the courts 
out of the business of enforcing restrictions on government endorsement of 
religion.89  At the moment, the Court seems poised to further weaken 
nonestablishment barriers on government speech, now in the context of 
legislative prayer.90  With the departure of Justice O’Connor, who was the 
chief architect of the rule against religious endorsements,91 and with the 
arrival in her stead of Justice Alito, who shows little affinity for that 
 
 86.  See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 87.  See Tebbe, Nonendorsement, supra note 44, at 648–50. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (dismissing a 
challenge to agency action promoting President Bush’s “faith-based initiatives” on standing 
grounds); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (dismissing a challenge to 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in schools on standing grounds).  See generally Steven D. 
Smith, Nonestablishment, Standing, and the Soft Constitution, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 (2011) 
(embracing these decisions as embodiments of a salutary move toward “soft constitutionalism”). 
 90.  See Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388 
(2013). 
 91.  See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88, 690–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).  
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principle,92 the Court may well move further in that direction, this time using 
substantive doctrine rather than procedural mechanisms.  So Establishment 
Clause law, which might seem like a natural focus for concern over liberal 
orthodoxy, actually cuts the other way.  
Nevertheless, alarm bells over liberal dominance do seem to be 
sounding more loudly and more frequently of late.93  Perhaps that is because 
of a perception that the “culture wars” are coming to a close, and that 
progressives have won.  Two fronts of that conflict do seem to be moving 
decisively against advocates for traditional religion.  Rights for LGBT 
people are coming to be recognized at a rapid rate, not only in the area of 
marriage for same-sex couples, but somewhat more generally as well.94  
Insistence on health insurance coverage for female contraceptives by the 
Obama Administration is perhaps another indicator, although that fight is 
only now reaching the Supreme Court.95  Increasing recognition for 
nonbelievers has been cited as another area of advance for progressive 
forces.96  As Smith says, however, it is far too soon for progressives to 
declare victory.97  I have already mentioned Americans’ increasing tolerance 
for government expression of religious ideas, and on topics like reproductive 
freedom, the results are far more mixed.98  Still, there does seem to be a 
sense among traditional religious believers that they have come to occupy a 
minority position on several such questions.99  
That sense does much to explain the recent prevalence of a discourse of 
minority rights, antidiscrimination, and anti-orthodoxy among those 
concerned with the plight of so-called traditional religions.  Oftentimes, that 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 723, 728 (2010) (Alito, J., concurring in part) 
(expressing skepticism about the “so-called ‘endorsement test’”). 
 93.  See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See generally MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2012) (describing the extraordinarily 
rapid rise of the gay rights movement). 
 95.  See Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 
134 S. Ct. 678 (2013). 
 96.  Laycock, Sex, Atheism, supra note 2, at 419–20. 
 97.  Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 932 (noting that the debate “bids to continue for 
some time to come”). 
 98.  See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text.  
 99.  See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime, Inclusion, Accommodation, and Recognition: Accounting for 
Differences Based on Religion and Sexual Orientation, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 303, 323–25 
(2009). 
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discourse deploys the language of religious freedom, yet just as often it 
invokes universal guarantees such as free speech, equal citizenship, and 
freedom of association in order to remind liberals and progressives that their 
commitments to those principles should not only protect themselves when 
they are in the minority, but also more traditional citizens when political 
fortunes are reversed.100  This is not to say that warnings about liberal 
orthodoxy are not sincere and powerful.  Rather, the point is that this 
language is exactly what you would expect to see in a constitutional 
democracy when a group finds itself newly or differently embattled.  Smith 
is right to say that whether such arguments prevail will depend as much on 
political and social dynamics as on their legal authority.101 
*** 
Smith closes by predicting—albeit tentatively and conditionally—that 
the fortunes of religious freedom as a legal doctrine will depend on the 
fortunes of “the church” in politics and society.102  If and only if “the 
church” continues to thrive in American society will religious freedom 
continue to be protected vigorously.103  Many questions surround this claim, 
including whether it makes sense to speak of “the church” when Christian 
faiths proliferate, something Smith discusses;104 how other organized 
religions fit into this conception; whether it might make more sense to link 
the fortunes of religious freedom to the health and prevalence of religious 
practice in America rather than to institutionalized faith; whether the new 
prominence of nonbelievers weakens or strengthens religious freedom, and 
so forth.  Yet Smith’s fundamental argument is convincing—that the health 
of religious freedom in constitutional practice will likely be closely linked to 
the fortunes of religion in wider social and political dynamics. 
Those dynamics include not only general demographic trends, such as 
the percentage of Americans who affiliate with religious organizations or 
who regularly attend worship services.105  They also feature perceptions of 
 
 100.  See Smith, The Last Chapter?, supra note 1, at 920–21. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Id. at 128. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See generally, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE: HOW 
RELIGION DIVIDES AND UNITES US 129 (2012) (demonstrating, inter alia, the increased disaffiliation 
of Americans from organized religion, partly in response to the gay rights movement). 
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religion and of religious freedom that emerge from controversies over 
marriage between people of the same sex,106 equality of opportunity for 
LGBT people in employment and schooling,107 health insurance coverage for 
employees under the contraception mandate,108 exclusion from membership 
by faith-based student groups on university campuses,109 and so forth.  
Views on these disputes—and on the constitutional questions implicated in 
them—will be influenced by grassroots religious groups, by the social 
movement for LGBT rights, by media coverage, by positions taken by 
political parties, by local and state governments, and of course by arguments 
made in Congress and by executive branch officials including the President.  
Outcomes of religious freedom disputes that make it to the courts will 
depend in large measure on convictions formed in the context of these wider 
political and social debates.  
Yet the persuasiveness of this observation sits in some tension with 
worry over the state of the doctrine.110  Will outcomes really turn on whether 
constitutional actors continue to place religion in its own constitutional 
category? Even if religion ceases to be special as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine, there are plenty of legal resources that will continue to be available 
to protect religious observance, as argued above.111  Social forces will drive 
legal outcomes to a significant degree regardless of whether religion 
 
 106.  See, e.g., Jesse McKinley & Kirk Johnson, Mormons Tipped Scale in Ban on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/15/us/politics/15marriage.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting on the role of the Mormon Church in passing Proposition 8, the 
ballot initiative that amended the California constitution to prohibit marriage between people of the 
same sex). 
 107.  See, e.g., Stephanie Francis Ward, For Young People, Transgender Life Means Stress and 
Confusion over Restrooms, Sports and Harassment, ABA J., Oct. 2013, available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_gender_change_at_a_tender_age/ (reporting on 
religious freedom challenges to a Massachusetts law that protects transgender people in employment 
and education). 
 108.  At present, the leading examples, of course, are the challenges by for-profit corporations to 
the regulation requiring them to provide health insurance coverage for contraception.  Sebelius v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013); 
Conestoga Woods Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. 
Ct. 678  (2013). 
 109.  See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010) (upholding a decision 
by a public university to deny official recognition to a Christian student group that excluded 
members who did not adhere to its policies on sexual morality). 
 110.  See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text. 
 111.  See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text. 
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continues to be viewed as constitutionally special. To be sure, doctrinal and 
social developments likely will move together, so that decline in the 
specialness of religion will accompany decline of social regard for religion. 
That seems to be Smith’s point at the end, and it is well taken.  But that 
argument also calls into question whether lawyerly and academic arguments 
against the constitutional specialness of religion are the primary drivers of 
actual outcomes in legal disputes. 
Similar questions surround claims about the confusions and 
contradictions of religious freedom doctrine.112  If social and political 
influences are largely responsible for the broad pattern of outcomes in court 
cases, then we should be less concerned about the state of the doctrine, 
except as a symptom of those broader dynamics. Confused holdings will not 
necessarily herald weaker protection for religious actors.  That is not to say 
that legal arguments about the meaning of the Constitution have no influence 
on politics and society. Causation works in both directions.  But mutual 
influence is a matter of degree, and if Smith is right that the principal causes 
are extralegal, then the stakes of debates over doctrinal matters—such as the 
specialness of religion or the weakness of constitutional rules as 
predictors—could be low. 
My conclusion is not that debates over constitutional theory and 
political morality do not matter—again, low stakes is not the same as no 
stakes—but instead that they have limited impact on outcomes.  Concerns 
over the health of religious freedom as a concept may well resonate with 
broader conversations that Americans are having in the context of specific 
cases like the constitutionality of the contraception mandate or the impact of 
same-sex marriage on communities of faith.  However, component concerns 
over the specialness of religion or the muddled state of the doctrine may turn 
out to be, if not entirely epiphenomenal, then weak influences on the fate of 
the concept of religious freedom among Americans. 
 
 112.  See supra notes 49–77 and accompanying text. 
